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RECOGNIZING AND DEFINING LEGAL
MALPRACTICE
RONAm E. MALFx.*
Although virtually every American jurisdiction has recog-
nized that attorneys may be liable for legal malpractice,' a party
contemplating such an action might encounter reluctance by at-
torneys to sue a fellow member of the bar.2 The risk of such a
"conspiracy of silence" is not great, however, because of the attor-
ney's ethical obligation to provide legal services to those who have
been wrongly injured. The American Bar Association's former
Canons of Ethics provided in part, "Lawyers . . should accept
without hesitation employment against a member of the Bar who
has wronged his client."3 Similarly, the present Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility states, in part, "The personal preference of
a lawyer to avoid adversary alignment against. . . other lawyers
, , * does not justify his rejection of tendered employment."4 The
courts have not been overly receptive to legal malpractice claims
and surprisingly little judicial guidance can be found on the ele-
ments of the tort. But, despite resistance by members of the
profession, adverse treatment by the courts, and the lack of judi-
cial guidance, legal malpractice claims are becoming a signifi-
cantly increasing reality for the practicing attorney.5
Recently, it has been popular to talk of the impending mal-
practice and insurance crisis. This has produced a flurry of
* Member, California State Bar; partner, Long & Levit.
1. To date, only Wyoming has not reported appellate decisions involving damage
actions against attorneys for negligence. See R. MALLEN & V. Lavrr, LEGAL MALPRACCE
631-60 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MALLEN & LEmrr]. The forthcoming supplement to that
book will note that, since the 1977 publication, the Idaho Supreme Court has decided
Martin v. Clements, 98 Idaho 906, 575 P.2d 885 (1978).
2. See ABA CoMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmcS, OPINIONS, No. 144 (1935) (noting diffi-
culty of obtaining legal representation for a claim against an attorney).
3. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 29.
4. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICAL CONSMERATION No. 2-28. The
change in the form of stating the ethical obligation may be, in part, because of the
increased probability that attorneys will be faced with this problem.
5. In 1973, malpractice claims were filed against only about .5% of attorneys nation-
wide. This figure increased to 6% in 1976 and was projected to be 8% in 1977. 1
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY REP. 185-86 (May 1977). From the dates given, it can be seen that
this projection is now outdated. The point is that legal malpractice claims are increasing
at a rapid rate. No national data bank of statistics has been established from which one
can gather accurate and up-to-date statistical information on legal malpractice claims.
The percentage figures used in this preface are based on estimates provided to the author
by various insurance companies.
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suggestions about how to solve or avoid malpractice, as well as
proposed alternatives to private insurance." Avoiding malpractice
claims, which this symposium addresses, must necessarily start
with an understanding of what constitutes legal malpractice.
The phrase "legal malpractice" is commonly used to describe
a kind of tortious conduct, but there is little agreement on, or
even discussion of, the meaning of the phrase. Some early deci-
sions have offered a sinister-sounding definition in proposing that
"malpractice as a lawyer means evil practice in a professional
capacity, and the resort to methods and practices unsanctioned
and prohibited by law."7 Subsequent decisions have explained
that this definition was intended to describe only wrongs that
affected the court, rather than wrongs to the client.' Other defini-
tions that can be found usually are descriptions of the kind of
conduct contemplated by a statute of limitations that refers gen-
erally to "malpractice."
Legal malpractice can be defined. That definition may be
either theoretical or practical. The former approach may be use-
ful to legislators, writers, lecturers, scholars, and others who need
a theoretically consistent basis for communication. The latter
approach is more meaningful to the practitioner since it identifies
those types of liability claims that, regardless of merit, hazard the
practice of law.
DEFINITIONS - A THEORETICAL APPROACH
The theoretical approach requires the identification of those
bases of liability that are unique to and arise out of the rendition
of professional services.' The test for distinguishing malpractice
from other wrongs is whether the wrong primarily concerns the
quality of the legal services. Therefore, actual fraud by an attor-
ney would not be considered legal malpractice since such conduct
6. For a summary of the alternative mechanisms, see ABA SPECIAL COMMIrE ON
LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, LEGAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A PRIMER FOR THE ORGAN-
IZED BAR 107-53 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PRIMER].
7. In re Baum, 62 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 611, 8 N.Y.S. 771 (1890).
8. E.g., Strauss v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 30 Misc. 2d 345, 347, 216 N.Y.S.2d 861,
864 (1961).
9. A similar approach is taken by professional liability insurers. Although practices
vary among insurers, they consistently afford coverage for "acts, errors or omissions
arising out of professional services rendered in the insured's capacity as a lawyer." PRIMER,
supra note 6, at 25. The liability insurance definition may encompass more wrongs than
the theortical definition offered in the text since this insurance is intended to give broad
protection to lawyers who face a wide range of hazards.
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is neither unique to the legal profession nor does it necessarily
concern the quality of professional services any more than does
dishonesty by a layman. Similarly, an action for breach of an
express contract would not be malpractice since the wrong is the
failure to perform a promise rather than a deficiency in the qual-
ity of services.
On the other hand, clearly within the definition of legal mal-
practice is the negligent rendition of professional services. The
courts agree that "legal malpractice" encompasses liability for
negligence.' 0 That wrong is sometimes alternatively stated in
terms of an implied contract to exercise ordinary skill and knowl-
edge, corresponding to the standard of care used to evaluate com-
petence." To that extent the attorney's liability is comparable to
that of other professionals.
The attorney's malpractice exposure differs from other pro-
fessionals, however, because liability may also be based on a
breach of the fiduciary obligations, such as an unauthorized dis-
closure of the client's confidence 12 or the representation of adverse
or conflicting interests." Among professionals, only attorneys are
commonly sued for breaches of fiduciary obligations.
Some courts seem to distinguish a breach of the fiduciary
obligations from legal malpractice." But, the prevailing and more
reasonable view is that legal malpractice encompasses any profes-
sional misconduct whether attributable to a breach of the stan-
dard of care or of the fidicuary obligations. In recognition of the
dual bases of an attorney's liability, some courts have referred to
the fiduciary obligations as setting forth a standard of
10. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. v. Lust, 479 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973); Long v.
Bowersox, 8 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 249 (1909). See also Cordial v. Grimm, 346 N.E.2d 266 (Ind.
App. 1976).
11. Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal. App. 3d 914, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1976); Ventura
County Humane Soc'y for P.C.C.&A., Inc. v. Holloway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 897, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 464 (1974); Floro v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1960); Brackett
v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517 (1823); Weekly v. Knight, 116 Fla. 721,156 So. 625 (1934); Kartikes
v. Demos, 214 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Rooker v. Bruce, 45 Ind. App. 57, 90
N.E. 86 (1909); Thomas v. Schee, 80 Iowa 237, 45 N.W. 539 (1890); Roehl v. Ralph, 84
S.W.2d 405 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935); Peters v. Simmons, 87 Wash. 2d 400, 552 P.2d 1053
(1976).
12. See, e.g., Lakoff v. Lionel Corp., 207 Misc. 319, 137 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1955). For a
discussion of liability based on breach of fiduciary obligations, see generally MALM &
LEvr, supra note 1, at §§ 91-103.
13. See, e.g., Fielding v. Brebbia, 399 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See generally
MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 1, at §§ 95, 99.
14. See Green v. Zukernick, 133 So. 2d 442 (Fla. App. 1961); Vessel v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d 874 (La. App. 1973).
1979]
3
Mallen: Recognizing and Defining Legal Malpractice
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
"conduct."'" Thus, under the theoretical approach legal malprac-
tice may be defined as a breach by an attorney of either the
standard of care or of the standard of conduct.
DEFINITIONS-A PRACTICAL APPROACH
The practical approach to defining legal malpractice requires
examination, analysis, and cataloging of the types of claims that
are being asserted against lawyers. It is beyond the scope of this
preface to give a detailed analysis of particular fact situations
that can form the substantive basis of a claim. But a synthesis
and classification of those claims into recognizable categories can
alert the practitioner to areas where he may find himself exposed
to malpractice liability. Such a review not only provides insight
into the nature of the claims being asserted, but also indicates
some of the reasons for legal malpractice claims.
Adversary-Nonclient.-One very significant area of exposure
that does not fall within the proposed theoretical definition con-
sists of claims not concerning a deficiency in the quality of the
attorney's services rendered to the client,' but rather an injury
caused to a third party because of the attorney's representation.
This category includes tort claims that may be filed against an
attorney, as well as claims arising from various statutes, most
notably in the area of securities regulation. Reported appellate
decisions and insurance company statistics disclose that claim-
ants in this third party category constitute approximately twenty
percent of those persons who sue attorneys.
Most of these plaintiffs allege intentional torts, such as mali-
cious prosecution," abuse of process,'" infliction of emotional dis-
tress,'9 defamation, 0 interference with an advantageous relation-
ship,2' and a series of other tort theories predicated upon the
15. E.g., Palfy v. Rice, 473 P.2d 606 (Alaska 1970); Bank of Mill Creek v. Elk Horn
Coal Corp., 133 W. Va. 639, 57 S.E.2d 736 (1950).
16. The erosion of the privity of contract requirement has permitted those persons
who were not clients but who were intended to benefit by the attorney's services to sue
the attorney for malpractice. See, e.g., Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr.
191 (1971); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). See generally MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 1, at §§ 57, 59.
17. See, e.g., Carroll v. Kalar, 112 Ariz. 595, 545 P.2d 411 (1976).
18. See, e.g., Four Star Stage Lighting, Inc. v. Merrick, 56 A.D.2d 767, 392 N.Y.S.2d
297 (1977).
19. E.g., Grimm v. Bam, 22 Misc. 2d 982, 195 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1959).
20. E.g., Sampson v. Rumsey, 1 Kan. App. 2d 191, 563 P.2d 506 (1977).
21. E.g., Bledsoe v. Watson, 30 Cal. App. 3d 105, 106 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1973).
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manner in which the attorney represented his client.22 The suits
are rarely successful since, with the exception of malicious prose-
cution, the attorney has available a number of absolute and qual-
ified privileges.2? These claims are often concluded at the plead-
ing stage. Even if tried, successful prosecution requires proof of a
type of intentional conduct tantamount to malice. Experience
discloses that an attorney's actions, even if seemingly hostile to
the adverse party, are at worst attributable to overly zealous
representation of the client's interests rather than to any ulterior
or -sinister motive. This kind of mental state usually does not,
and should not, suffice as the malice required for liability. Unfor-
tunately, lack of success by plaintiffs has not diminished the
frequency of such actions.
Various statutes also provide causes of action for nonclient
plaintiffs. A frequently used statute is the Civil Rights Act of
1871,4 which almost invariably fails as the basis for a cause of
action since an attorney does not normally act under "color of
law." 21 Yet, regardless of whether such actions are successful,
they must be defended at a significant expense, and they do
constitute an occupational hazard for attorneys.
Monetarily, the statutes posing the greatest financial expo-
sure to attorneys are the federal securities laws, particularly the
Securities Act of 1933,21 the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934,27 and corresponding state blue sky laws. Statistically,
claims based on these statutes constitute only two to three per-
cent of all actions filed against attorneys. Yet, few lawsuits
against attorneys routinely approach the judgment exposure and
defense costs of securities litigation.? Major securities litigation
often involves claims aggregating in excess of $10 million with
defense expenditures not infrequently exceeding a million dollars.
Unfavorable experience by insurers with securities litigation has
22. For a discussion of various theories of recovery that have been used against
attorneys, see MAuLEN & LEvrr, supra note 1, at §§ 45-52.
23. E.g., Lerette v. Dean Witter Organization, Inc., 60 Cal. App. 3d 573, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1976). See generally MALLEN & LEvIT, supra note 1, at § 176.
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1995 (1976). Most actions are based on §§ 1983 and 1985 of
the statute.
25. See, e.g., Deas v. Potts, 547 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1976); Shelton v. Randolph, 373
F. Supp. 448 (W.D. Va. 1974). See generally MALLN & Lnvrr, supra note 1, at § 80.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1976).
27. Id. § 78a-kk.
28. For a full discussion of policies and procedures for avoiding malpractice liability
in the securities field, see J. Smith, Preventing Errors in Securities Transactions, 30
S.C.L. REV. 243 (1979).
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seriously limited the availability of coverage for these claims and
has influenced some insurers to withdraw from the professional
liability field."
Fee Disputes.3°-A second major area of legal malpractice
claims is that of cross-actions filed in response to actions by attor-
neys for fees. Although the frequency of these cross-actions is
declining (perhaps because of an increased reluctance by attor-
neys to sue to recover their fees), some insurers have reported that
within the last three years malpractice cross-actions filed in re-
sponse to fee actions approximated twenty percent of all claims
against attorneys.
Legal malpractice is a defense to an action for legal fees. 3' As
a defense it can reduce or even totally eliminate the attorney's
recovery of fees. The further contention that the client has sus-
tained an actual injury can convert the claim into one for affirma-
tive relief. The step from the elimination of the fee to the claim
for affirmative relief is more than simply a matter of degree. A
plaintiff then becomes a defendant. The attorney must notify his
professional liability insurer and incur the usual, substantial de-
ductible that applies to the cost of defense of a legal malpractice
claim. Unquestionably, a cross-action for legal malpractice is a
deterrent to pursuing an action for legal fees. It is coercive, and
the psychological effect may result in a disadvantageous settle-
ment of the fee claim. When such a cross-action is without merit,
however, and is filed solely for tactical purposes, it becomes a
form of malicious prosecution. 3 Angry attorneys who have suc-
cessfully defended these claims are retaliating with malicious
prosecution suits both against their former clients and those
clients' attorneys.
33
Although not filing an action for legal fees will avoid the risk
29. E.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. has withdrawn from the professional liabil-
ity field. For an example of a possible incentive for this withdrawal, see S.E.C. v. Nat'l
Student Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973).
30. See generally MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 1, at § 12.
31. E.g., Felger v. Nichols, 35 Md. App. 182, 370 A.2d 141 (1977). See generally
MALLEN & Lavrr, supra note 1, at § 223.
32. See Bertero v. National Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr.
184 (1975).
33. Like the legendary Phoenix, malicious prosecution suits tend to reappear as an-
other and a retaliatory malicious prosecution action. Theoretically, one such suit can give
rise to infinite progeny. Although none of these retaliatory actions have yet reached the
appellate stage, the writer has come into contact with them through his own experience,
particularly through dealings with malpractice insurers. Retaliatory suits should be ex-
pected in legal malpractice cases in light of their frequency in medical malpractice cases.
[Vol. 30
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of a cross-action for malpractice, the solution to the problem
should more appropriately commence with the initial handling of
the attorney-client relationship. Disputes over fees can and
should be avoided. The origins of these claims are usually attrib-
utable to the failure to reach agreement on the basis for the fees
and to provide the client with timely and adequate explanation
of the services rendered. 4 As is true of most attorney-client prob-
lems, the origin is in poor communication. The skill and effort
that has been put into a client's representation will not be appre-
ciated at the time of billing unless it has been previously re-
ported.
Negligence in the Professional Relationship. -Perhaps one-
fourth or more of legal malpractice claims are due to negligence,
not in the rendition of legal services, but in the handling of the
attorney-client relationship. 5 The impression of the "neglectful"
attorney is too often created by a failure in communication rather
than a deficiency in the quality of services. Of course, the catalyst
for the client's dissatisfaction is a result that is subjectively unsa-
tisfactory. The client faults the attorney who he believes either
caused the unfavorable result or failed to avoid it. Usually, the
attorney's error is the failure either to adjust the client's expecta-
tions to the difficulty and reality of the legal problem or to com-
municate the quality of his efforts. Either error may turn out to
be the only reason for the legal malpractice claim.
The prudent attorney will inform the client of those consider-
ations that may seriously hinder achievement of the client's legal
goals. The attorney who seeks to "comfort" the client with un-
realistic assurances of success will most likely find that he has
raised the client's expectations to a level that no lawyer could
achieve, yet that will be the measure of his performance. The
attorney who fails to inform the client of his efforts and success
is not being modest but imprudent. Without this communication,
the client is unlikely to be aware of the quality of representation.
Too many clients end up believing that the good result occurred
despite the attorney's efforts and the bad result occurred because
of the attorney's inadequacies.
Negligence-Errors. -Negligence, of course, is the category
generally associated with legal malpractice. The premise is that
an attorney has committed an error that would have been avoided
by the hypothetical "competent" attorney who comports with the
34. See, e.g., Neville v. Davinroy, 41 Ill. App. 3d 706, 355 N.E.2d 86 (1976).
35. See MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 1, at § 17.
1979]
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standard of care. Several articles in this symposium consider in
detail the different kinds of errors that can lead to malpractice
liability. But, a word of caution is in order at this point to those
considering prosecution of a legal malpractice claim. Many ac-
tions against attorneys superficially appear to be justified, but
upon closer analysis disclose deficiencies in the supposed exist-
ence of the legal malpractice cause of action. Many actions
against attorneys are filed because of a documented error of
judgment that injures the client. Yet, too many of these plain-
tiffs and their new attorneys fail to recognize that an error of
judgment by an attorney is* an issue different from, and irrelevant
to, the determination of whether the attorney was negligent.M
A legal malpractice action is unlikely to succeed when the attor-
ney erred because an issue of law was unsettled or debatable.Y
The perfect vision and wisdom of hindsight is an unreliable test
for determining the past existence of legal malpractice.
Yet, even if there was a negligent error, many lawsuits fail
because of the absence of provable damage. A cause of action that
would not have succeeded even if competently prosecuted cannot
result in malpractice liability. 38 Similarly, a significant number
of malpractice actions are destined for failure because of the in-
ability of the client to show that even if a favorable judgment
were recovered, there would have been a solvent defendant to
pay it."
Although errors and actual negligence may inspire legal mal-
practice suits, more is required for liability.
CONCLUSION
In today's consumer-oriented society, litigation has become
a common, if not an acceptable, means of vindicating believed
wrongs and compensating supposed injuries. The increasing com-
plexity of modern civilization with the accompanying specializa-
36. Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F. Supp. 1283 (M.D. La. 1913),
aff'd, 500 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1974); Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 La.
774, 269 So. 2d 239 (1972); Meagher v. Kavli, 256 Minn. 54, 97 N.W.2d 370 (1959); Gimbel
v. Waldman, 193 Misc. 758, 84 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1948); Rapuzzi v. Stetson, 160 A.D. 150,
145 N.Y.S. 455 (1914); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954); Hill v.
Mynatt, 59 S.W. 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1900).
37. But see Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975)
(although the issue of law was actually debatable, the attorney had failed to conduct
research to determine that fact).
38. E.g., Jones v. Wright, 19 Ga. App. 242, 91 S.E. 265 (1917). See generally Annot.,
45 A.L.R.2d 5, at 19 (1956).
39. Id.
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tion of professionals appears to have raised the consumer's expec-
tations for beneficial results. No longer is the public reluctant to
question and challenge the competence of professionals. The at-
torney has not escaped the litigation plight of his contemporaries
in other professions when those expectations are not realized.
Legal malpractice does exist and has not, and probably will
not, be eliminated by the profession's self-regulation. The disci-
plinary mechanism was not designed to regulate the malpractic-
ing attorney, but rather to deal with those wrongs that threaten
the integrity of the attorney-client relationship. The disciplinary
system has both prophylactic and punitive objectives, the latter
often in an exemplary sense. But, that system is not concerned
with the compensation of a client for an injury, indeed the com-
plaining party need not have sustained damage.40 Generally, the
injured or complaining party is not even a party to the proceed-
ing. 4
1
In time, testing, licensing, formal specialization, continuing
education, and relicensing are expected to raise the general level
of competence in the profession. Legal malpractice suits may
have a salutory effect. Self-protection is a strong incentive for
improving both the administrative aspects of the practice of law
as well as the quality of the attorney-client relationship.
As legal malpractice actions continue to hazard the practice
of law, the manner in which lawyers respond may significantly
alter the rules and philosophy by which we practice law. If that
reaction is one of caution and introspection, the result is likely to
be constructive, improving both the general competence of the
profession and the quality of the attorney-client relationship. On
the other hand, if the response is retaliatory litigation and self-
protective legislation, the risk is to the very credibility and integ-
rity of the profession. Prophecy aside, there are two certainties:
(1) the frequency of legal malpractice claims will continue to
increase, and (2) the profession will, somehow, be changed.
40. E.g., Athearn v. State Bar, 20 Cal. 3d 218, 571 P.2d 628,142 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1977).
41. Slotnick v. Pike, 370 N.E.2d 1006 (Mass. 1977). See also Disbarment in the
United States: Who Shall do the Noisome Work?, 12 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoB. 1 (1975)
(procedural practices in the different jurisdictions are given in chart form at 44-45).
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